OK there's a fair bit here to unpack.
Blurring of dividing line between "Islam" on
the one hand and "extremism" and "terrorism" on the other.
Government statements and policies have exacerbated this process.
"Howardism" placed domestic and international
terrorism "at the epicentre" of the Commonwealth's "political
cosmology” (at 46).
Prior to 9/11, very little government policy on terrorism
threats.
Howard become "the staunchest member of the
'coalition of the willing' and one of the strongest advocates of the 'War on
Terror'" (at 46)
In his rhetoric, Howard insisted the war on terror was
not a war on Islam itself or on Australia's neighbouring Muslim-majority
states.
Howard's deeply held view that the War on Terror was
morally correct. This would "underline all subsequent internal and
external policies and pronouncements" (at 47)
The “moral panic” concerning Islam meant that issues
related to "Muslim identity and
culture featured heavily whenever politicians or journalists brought out the
'dog-whistle'" (at 50).
Howard's non (if not anti) cosmopolitan vision. "
... he spoke of the importance of re-affirming Australia's Judeo-Christian and
British cultural core". Diversity was not emphasised.
Costello: "subscribe to Australian values or don't
bother coming here".
Terrorism was raised in PM's speeches some 762 times between
September 2001 and April 2006.
Australian and Western media treating Muslim world as closed
spaces. Essentialist and simplistic view of Islam and Muslims as being
necessarily violent and a problem. This internalises the war on terror and
means domestic events are seen as part of a broader international Muslim
problem.
By globally framing Muslims and Islam as a 'problem', you
automatically internalise the 'War on Terror', allowing the insertion of
domestic events in a perpetual cycle that reinforces preconceived notions that
Islam and Muslims constitute a problematic, and therefore threatening,
proposition". (at 52)
Before 2002, Australia had no dedicated legislative
counterterrorism law outside the conventional criminal law. Only NT had an offence proscribing a terrorist
attack.
"Australian governments moved to establish a
comprehensive anti-terrorism framework, which expanded incrementally ...
typically with increased strengthening in the wake of 'peak' terrorist events
around the globe." (at 56)
Impact of London bombings. "unprecedented toughening
of Australia's counterterrorism regime" with legislation largely based on
UK legislation (at 58).
Part of the tranche of legislation was passed after
Howard declared the government "had received specific intelligence and
police information this week which gives cause for serious concern about a
potential terrorist threat ... [T]he immediate passage of [the Bill] would
strengthen the capacity of law enforcement agencies to effectively respond to
this threat". Legislation made on the run.
Before 9/11 Muslims were perceived by ethnicity rather
than religion. Most lived in Sydney (47.3%) and Melbourne (30.3%) according to
2006 census. 180 different birthplaces, with largest group (37.9%) born in
Australia.
"September 11 was followed by a marked increase in
number and intensity of reported instances of attacks, harassment and
culturally offensive behaviour aimed at Muslims generally" (at 59)
London terror attacks triggered concern of prospect of
home grown terrorism. Consultations were commenced with religious
organisational representatives, most of whom were not born in Australia and
represented mainly cultural and ethnic mosques. The first batch of leaders were
almost exclusively men.. A statement of principles declared "overriding
loyalty to Australia" (a requirement which implies such loyalties didn't
already exist, that Muslims were too "cosmopolitan" and too bound up
by loyalties outside Australia). It also insisted "members of the Muslim
faith, and in particular its leaders, have a responsibility to challenge and
counteract those who seek to encourage the use of violence and terrorism in the
name of Islam" and "take a
lead with their communities and other Islamic organisations ... to challenge
violence and extremism" (at 60). An enormous responsibility placed on a
leadership that was often criticised for being largely unrepresentative of
those identifying as Muslim. Terrorism and violence was linked to Islam (and by
direct implication those who deem themselves belonging to it in some way) with
Muslims playing some kind of policing rule in counteracting violence. It was a
patronising policy agenda which was readily agreed to by religious leaders with
little understanding of political processes, public policy, let alone a working
knowledge of the English language.
The establishment of the Muslim Community Reference Group
of members hand-picked by the Federal Government specifically excluded more
"hardline" and "extreme" groups. This in effect created a
division between "moderate" and "extreme", good and bad
Muslims, those Muslims worth talking to and those to be excluded from the
engagement process. It created an impression that dealing with national
security involved the government (representing the mainstream Australian
electorate) entering into dialogue with a small subset of a very small group.
Muslims were expected to take ownership of and hence responsibility
for homegrown extremism. This may be seen as government deflecting
responsibility for essential elements of counterterrorism. Another purpose was
to have a Muslim rubber stamp on a revolutionary legislative agenda impacting
potentially upon civil liberties of not just Muslims but also used as a
blueprint for future legislation curtailing other groups such as bikies.
The MCRG tended to focus on leaders of either ethnic
mosques or campus groups. Important omissions were women's groups, business
groups and professionals. It was an attempt by government "to construct
and superimpose a single communal structure contrary to the history,
composition and demography of Muslims in Australia" (at 61).
